“Resolving a Debate Over Freedom” in The Southern Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)

Social freedom theorists argue that one is unfree when one’s inability is casually or morally brought about by other persons but merely unable when one’s inability is brought about by oneself or nature. The causality view holds that I am unfree to do x when others are causally responsible for my inability, whereas the responsibility view holds that to determine whether I am unfree, we should ask whether the others are morally responsible for my inability. I capture the strengths of each view and avoid their weaknesses by suggesting a novel interpretation of moral responsibility as answerability, according to which we are answerable for all our actions in virtue of the fact that our actions reflect our evaluative judgments. This interpretation allows for a plausible resolution of the disagreement between these views.

“The Ability-Independent Value of Freedom” in European Journal of Political Theory

I argue that freedom has ability-independent value as it can be valuable even when it cannot be exercised. I develop a typology that distinguishes between content-dependent and content-independent values of freedom, each of which can be either ability-dependent or ability-independent. My findings challenge the prevailing assumption that only exercisable freedoms are valuable, and expand the normative landscape by introducing a new category of contributory value, which captures how freedom can be valuable even when it plays neither a causal nor a conceptual role in relation to other valuable phenomena.

Review of John Christman’s Reconceiving Freedom from the Shadows of Slavery Liberty in a Nonideal World in Argumenta

John Christman avoids three common pitfalls: reliance on a “true self,” perfectionism, and moralizing freedom. His account defines freedom through four conditions: absence of prevention, relevant capabilities, social recognition, and endorsable socially constituted practices. While the book demonstrates remarkable philosophical precision and historical grounding, significant tensions emerge. Christman’s political realism constraint—requiring conceptions of freedom to guide realizable action—conflicts with long-term emancipatory ideals, as illustrated by historical cases like Quaker abolitionists. Additionally, making social recognition definitional renders the account conservative, preventing advocates of unrecognized practices from claiming unfreedom.

“Exodus by Choice: Voluntariness in Ethnic Migration Sagas” in Caucasus Survey

How do we determine whether a migration is voluntary when persons organize their own displacement under the shadow of ethnic violence? I examine this question through a case study of a 1989 village exchange between Azerbaijanis from Gizil-Shafag (ArmSSR) and Armenians from Karkanj ( AzSSR), where residents negotiated their mutual relocation under threats to their safety. I show why the agential account of voluntariness fails to capture the fundamental difference between fleeing ethnic violence and migrating for career advancement, whereas the political account not only better reflects the lived experiences of ethnic minorities facing displacement but also provides clearer guidance for migration policies.

“Republican Freedom, Domination, and Ignorability“ – with Anar Jafarov in The Journal of Political Power

Some argue that republican freedom is impossible because since it is always possible that a person or a group of persons possesses arbitrary power to interfere with individuals, no one is free to do anything. To avoid this challenge, Sean Ingham and Frank Lovett invoke the notion of ignorability in terms of which they offer a moderate interpretation of republican freedom. On their view, B is free from A to φ if A’s possible types who prefer to intervene with B’s φ-ing are ignorable. They also try to show that freedom is not determined by the probability of an intervention. We argue that they fail to do this and that freedom as non-domination is not entailed by ignorability.

For a reply by Lovett and Ingham, click here.

“Thoreau and the Idea of John Brown: The Radicalization of Transcendental Politics” – The Pluralist

Henry David Thoreau’s defense of John Brown has been interpreted as an inconsistency in his political philosophy. Since Thoreau was best known for his commitment to civil disobedience, his critics argued that his support for Brown constitutes a break in Thoreau’s political thought. However, I argue that A Plea for John Brown should be seen as a radicalization of Thoreau’s transcendental politics rather than an inconsistency in his writings. Understanding this decade-long process of radicalization requires an analysis of Thoreau’s four main essays from Resistance to Civil Government in 1849 to The Last Days of John Brown in 1860.

“Academic Freedom and University: The Case of Azerbaijan” – La liberté académique: Enjeux et menaces

I examine the difficult relationship between authoritarian power and the university in Azerbaijan through the study of coercive policies put in place by university administrators preventing free thought and hampering the freedom of academics. My central thesis is that a university is a place where researchers should be able to teach and conduct their research freely, without any hindrance from their administrators. However, in authoritarian countries, such as Azerbaijan, academic freedom suffers from regular interference and restrictions on the part of those administrators who, arguably due to the nature of the regime, assume that academics are not supposed to criticize the society, politics or universities in which they work.

“Halted Democracy: Government Hijacking of the New Opposition in Azerbaijan” – with Altay Goyushov in Politik und Gesellschaft im Kaukasus: Eine unruhige Region zwischen Tradition und Transformation

We argue that the new opposition in Azerbaijan between 2005 and 2013 influenced a new generation of young activists who became the loudest supporters of democratic and secular values in Azerbaijan. Because of the emergence of this new generation of active youth, the government was forced to incorporate some elements of this new discourse at least by making some cosmetic changes within its structures. The government became successful in its attempts of weakening the new opposition by creating similar but pro-government organizations; neutralizing or buying some well-known opposition figures; and persecuting the leading members of the youth organizations.